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1. Semantic Values and Pragmatic Values
Lewis (1986a:§5)1 articulates and explores a trio of important general theses con-
cerning pragmatic values:
(1) Pragmatic values are
i. irreducibly distinct from semantic denotations;
ii. sometimes specific to individual clause types; and
iii. appropriately modeled with probabilities.
Lewis (1976, 1986b) concentrates on material conditionals, arguing that their se-
mantic values are propositional but that their pragmatic values are given by con-
ditional subjective probabilities. Thus, from the start, the general theses (1) were
linked to close linguistic analysis involving both semantic and pragmatic consider-
ations. One comes away from Lewis’s papers with the sense that they could form
the cornerstone for a successful (probabilistic) formal pragmatic theory.
The present paper investigates the pragmatics of evidential sentences in
the general Lewisian terms (1). Now, evidential morphemes are rich and var-
ied in their contributions, they might not form a natural class cross-linguistically
(Matthewson et al. 2007:3, Speas 2007), and analyzing even a single morpheme
generally proves complex (Davis et al. 2007, Fasola 2007). Thus, we do not, in this
short paper, venture a comprehensive analysis. Rather, we focus on the pragmatic
strategy that evidentials facilitate. Section 2 discusses the pragmatics of evidential-
ity. Section 3 carves out a role for probabilities in pragmatic theory, and Section 4
describes our analysis. We close the paper with a discussion of the connections be-
tween evidentiality and modality (Section 5) and a brief look at various promising
extensions of these ideas (Section 6).
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2. The Pragmatics of Evidentiality
We are primarily concerned with evidential systems of the sort that Aikhenvald
(2004) characterizes as grammaticized: closed class, generally unmodifiable, often
obligatory, frequently bound morphemes. Thus, we largely set aside the evidential-
ity encoded in adverbial, parenthetical, and particle constructions. (For discussion,
see Rooryck 2001a,b, Aikhenvald 2004, McCready and Ogata 2007, Speas 2007.)
In (2), we provide some typical Tibetan examples, drawn from DeLancey (1986).
(2) a. K’oN
s/he
gis
ERG
yi-ge-bri-pa-soN.
write-PERF-DIRECT
‘She wrote a letter (I saw it happen).’
b. K’oN
s/he
gis
ERG
yi-ge-bri-pa-red.
write-PERF-INDIRECT
‘She wrote a letter (it seems).’
The Tibetan direct/indirect contrast highlights what seems to be, in some sense,
the most basic evidential contrast (Faller 2002b), though it should be emphasized
that Tibetan has a much richer set of contrasts when we consider its full system of
evidentiality.
Eastern Pomo makes a four-way distinction among evidence types (exam-
ples from McLendon 2003:101–102 and Aikhenvald 2004:52–53):
(3) a. bi·Yá
hand
pha·bé-kh-ink’e
burn-PUNCTUAL-SENSORY
‘I burned my hand’ (I feel the sensation of burning in my hand)
b. mí·-p-al
3sg-male.PATIENT
pha·bé-k-a
burn-PUNCTUAL-DIRECT
‘He got burned’ (I have direct evidence, e.g., I saw it happen)
c. bé·k-al
3pl-PATIENT
pha·bé-k-ine
burn-PUNCTUAL-INFERENTIAL
‘They must have gotten burned’ (I see circumstantial evidence— signs
of fire, bandages, burn cream)
d. bé·k-al
3pl-PATIENT
pha·bé-kh-·le
burn-PUNCTUAL-REPORTED
‘They got burned, they say’ (I am reporting what I was told)
The glosses impart a sense for the nature of the evidentials’ contributions, though
translation is a fraught affair, as we discuss in Sections 2.6 and 4.3. But the impor-
tant thing, for our purposes, is that evidential morphemes like these encode some-
thing about the speaker’s source of evidence for the information being offered. We
turn next to a closer look at this property. The subsections after that are inspired
by clause (ii) of (1): they explore some central pragmatic properties of evidential
sentences, concentrating on those that flow from the nature of the evidence source
and the way in which it is signaled linguistically.
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2.1. Evidence Sources
Evidential sentences have multifaceted meanings-in-context, and this makes them
of vital interest to researchers exploring all kinds of multidimensionality, includ-
ing those that derive from presupposition accommodation (Sauerland and Schenner
2007), conventional implicature (Potts 2005), and illocutionary force. In this paper,
we do not take a stand on the nature of these meanings. Rather, we highlight the
meaning component that seems to derive most directly from the presence of the evi-
dential morpheme: a speaker commitment to the existence of a situation of a certain
type.
For instance, in the Eastern Pomo example (3b), the speaker commits him-
self to having direct evidence for the propositional content. In (3d), he commits
himself to having heard a report of the propositional content. And so forth. The
information is generally not very specific: the source of hearsay information must
be recovered from the utterance context, for instance, since the evidential itself is
atomic and unmodifiable. Roughly speaking, then, the speaker commitments are
of the general form in (4), in which S[ev] is a declarative sentence containing an
evidential morpheme and [[·]] maps syntactic constituents to their meanings.
(4) Uttering S[ev] commits the speaker to the existence of a situation in which
he receives ev-type evidence for [[S]].
There is a persistent intuition that these morphemes form a hierarchy based on an
abstract notion of strength that relates intimately to evidence types. We turn now to
this issue.
2.2. Evidential Hierarchies
Cross-linguistically, grammaticized evidential morphemes fall into one of just a
handful of categories: personal experience, direct perception, hearsay, inferential,
conjectural, and a few others (Willett 1988, Speas 2004). Different languages
choose different subsets of the full set of evidential categories, and there is also
considerable variation concerning how the morpheme types relate to specific infor-
mation. But, as Speas (2004) observes, it is striking that so few of the conceivable
types are realized.
We aim to model the pragmatic fact that some evidential morphemes are
perceived to be stronger than others, and that this can, in turn, impact perceptions
about the speaker’s commitment to the main-clause content. One approach would
be to place them into a conventional hierarchy, along the lines of the pragmatic
scales often used for scalar inference (Fauconnier 1975, Horn 1989, Levinson 2000,
Sauerland 2004). The following basic hierarchy is drawn from Willett (1988:57):
(5) personalexperience !
direct (sensory)
evidence !
indirect
evidence ! hearsay
This makes intuitive sense. In our world (given our metaphysics), personal infor-
mation is privileged. I (and only I) can say with absolute certainty whether I am
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in pain, or anxious, or dislike the taste of cauliflower. And given the nature of our
world and our senses, direct information (visual, auditory, etc.) is extremely re-
liable, though we are more inclined to leave room for doubt given such evidence
than we are for personal experience. Lower down on the hierarchy, the evidence
becomes much less reliable. People pass on mistaken information, messages get
garbled in transmission, and our inferences from indirect evidence can be openly
full of holes. Thus, scales of the form in (5) seem grounded in extra-linguistic fac-
tors, so it is not surprising that the scales for individual languages tend to have its
basic shape. Some examples drawn from Faller (2002b):
(6) a. visual! nonvisual! apparent! secondhand! assumed
(Tuyuca; Barnes 1984)
b. performative! factual-visual ! auditory! inferential! quotative
(Kashaya; de Haan 1998)
With allowances for languages dividing up the space differently, this looks basically
in keeping with (5). However, Faller (2002b) argues convincingly that hierarchies
of the form in (5) and (6) are problematic. She reaches two general conclusions
about evidential hierarchies: (i) they should order evidence types, not evidential
morphemes; and (ii) they should be partial orders, with perhaps an abundance of
incomparable elements. We would like to emphasize also that (iii) the hierarchies
are subject to contextual variation (it is clear that Faller is thinking along these lines
as well; see especially §3.2). Hearsay evidence can be uncertain in one context
and solid in another. Inference is air-tight in some contexts but held to be loose in
others. And so forth. This suggests that the hierarchy is genuinely pragmatic, i.e.,
not something that we can conventionalize completely. In Section 4.1, we attempt
to make good on these three insights about the nature of evidential hierarchies.
2.3. Readings in Interrogatives
In the light of the above emphasis on speaker commitments, it is striking that evi-
dentials are possible in interrogative sentences. However, when they appear in such
clauses, they are often partly forward looking: their semantic contribution can im-
pact both the question and the range of expected replies. We illustrate in (7) with an
example from Tibetan, along with Garrett’s (2001) insight about its contribution.
(7) bkra.shis
Tashi
za.khang-la
restaurant
phyin-song-ngas
go-DIR.PAST-Q-EVIDENTIAL
‘Did Tashi go to the restaurant?’
“presupposes that the hearer has direct evidence that Tashi has either gone
or not gone to the restaurant, and expects [the hearer] to answer on such an
evidential basis” (Garrett 2001:229)
Similar data are reported in Faller (2002a:§6.3.2) for Cuzco Quechua:
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(8) Pi-ta-n
who-ACC-EVIDENTIAL
Inés-qa
Inés-TOP
watuku-rqa-n?
visit-PST1-3
‘Who did Inés visit?’
i. speaker has best possible grounds for asking
ii. speaker expects hearer to base his or her answer on best possible
grounds
If these assessments are correct, then the contribution of the evidential to an inter-
rogative is rather more pragmatic than one might expect. It seems that the evidential
does not modify answers-as-propositions, but rather answers-as-assertions, which
might initially suggest a performative semantics for interrogatives (for discussion,
see Karttunen 1977, Ginzburg and Sag 2001, Garrett 2001).
But the plot thickens. If we take seriously the characterizations in (7)–(8),
then the interrogative’s evidential can also target the question itself — its presup-
positions and grounds for felicitous use. So the contribution is rather diffuse. This
suggests that we cannot exclusively build the evidential in as a presupposition of
the question, nor will it work to make it part of the propositional content of the
elements that make up its content. The contribution is genuinely pragmatic in the
sense that it seems to be about the utterance context, rather than the meaning of any
particular utterance.
Before closing this section, we stress that the above examples do not rep-
resent the only attested function of evidentials in interrogatives. There is evidence
that, cross-linguistically, they sometimes target only the presuppositions of the sen-
tence, that they can function in a quotative fashion (Faller 2002a:233), and that they
are occasionally coaxed into entirely new meanings in these contexts. These phe-
nomena are in need of further investigation. However, for the theoretical ideas we
offer below, it is important only that readings like those described above are attested
for some uses of some morphemes in some languages.
2.4. Asserted?
There is a great deal of variation on the question of whether evidential-marked
declaratives can or must assert their propositional content, particularly when the ev-
idential is conjectural, hearsay, or inferential. The general verdict of Oswalt (1986)
is that evidential declaratives are asserted and that evidential morphemes do not
encode a reduced degree of certainty (see also Aikhenvald 2004). For Kashaya:
It might be noted that, despite the hierarchy, all propositions with
the Kashaya evidentials are presented by the speaker as being certain
and true. (Oswalt 1986:43)
Some authors dissent from this position for certain morphemes. For discussion, see
Faller (2002a), Matthewson et al. (2007), Sauerland and Schenner (2007), Fasola
(2007). The account we develop below is able to make sense of these conflicting
judgments.
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2.5. Strengthening
It’s a striking feature of evidentials that they can be perceived as strengthening
the overall assertive force of a declarative utterance. The strengthening generally
occurs with direct and personal experience evidentials. Cuzco Quechua provides
a useful illustration, since it is a language in which evidential marking is often
optional, and hence we can fairly freely compare S and S[direct]. Faller (2002a)
characterizes this shift in pragmatic terms:
The difference [. . . ] is felt by consultants to be one of emphasis such
that [a sentence with the direct evidential] is stronger than [one with
no evidential]. (Faller 2002a:23)
This possibility has important implications for how we situate evidentials with re-
spect to related operators. We address this question for modals in Section 5 below
and for utterance modifiers in our conclusion (Section 6).
2.6. Descriptive Ineffability
It is hard to say what evidentials mean — hard to translate them, and hard to para-
phrase them with other words of the same language. Faller (2002a) offers a general
characterization (see also Rooryck 2001a:126):
Evidentials are notoriously difficult to translate, and translations into
English tend to suggest that the evidential meaning does not con-
tribute to the proposition expressed. (Faller 2002a:23)
The issue arises not only for translation into languages that lack evidentials, but also
for translation into languages that have them, as the range of uses can differ subtly
or dramatically from one language to the next (Faller 2002b and Section 2.2). In
their descriptive ineffability (and arguably in other ways as well), evidentials seem
intimately related to expressive content items (Potts 2007).
3. Subjective Probabilities and Lewisian Quality
The previous section explored evidential sentences in the terms suggested by (1ii).
The present section focuses on clause (1iii), which defines a role for probabilities
in pragmatic investigation. Section 3.1 provides the general definitions and relates
them to the usual intensional models for linguistics. Section 3.2 then applies those
notions to a version of the maxim of quality. These general probabilistic notions
and our view of quality are both central to the theory of evidentials developed in
Section 4.
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3.1. Subjective Probabilities
Intensional models supply us with at least three ways to model an agent’s belief
state: as a set of propositions, as a single proposition (a region of logical space),
and as a subjective probability distribution. In this paper, we use probability dis-
tributions to gain a pragmatic perspective on propositional content in general and
epistemic states in particular:
(9) A probability distribution for a countable setW is a function PW from sub-
sets ofW into real numbers in the interval [0,1] obeying the conditions: (i)
PW (W) = 1; (ii) PW ({w})! 0 for all w ∈W ; and (iii) if p and q are disjoint
subsets ofW , then PW (p∪q) = PW (p)+PW (q). (We henceforth suppress
the superscriptW .)
These distributions support analogues of the usual operations on propositions: com-
plementation, intersection, and the concepts defined in terms of them. One can also
bring them closely in line with propositions (and epistemic states) in the usual sense
(Merin 1997, Potts 2006). Following Lewis (1986a:§5), we use them primarily to
model agents’ epistemic states: subjective probability as “the measure of reasonable
partial belief” (Lewis 1980:83). To do this, we take as basic a proposition DoxA,c
representing the epistemic state of agent A in context c. We then conditionalize a
uniform distribution, as in (10), to define a function CA,c (C for ‘credence’) that
maps any proposition p to A’s degree of belief in p in context c, as in (11).
(10) Let P(−|p) be the function that maps any proposition q to
P(q|p) def= P(q∩ p)P(p) (undefined if P(p) = 0)
where P is a probability distribution. That is, P(−|p) maps propositions to
their conditional probabilities (for P) given p.
(11) The subjective probability distribution for an agent A in context c:
CA,c
def
= P(−|DoxA,c)
in which P is a uniform distribution overW , i.e., P({w}) = 1|W | for all w ∈
W .
The examples in (12) suggest the ways in which CA,c models facts about A’s belief
state:
(12) a. CA,c(p) = 1 A fully believes p
b. CA,c(p) = .5 A is unbiased about p
c. CA,c(p) = .98 A strongly suspects p
d. CA,c(p) = 0 A disbelieves p
We make extensive use of the space between the extremes (12a) and (12d). For
more on the role that such distributions might play in semantics and pragmatics, see
Lewis (1986a:§5,7), Merin (1997), van Rooy (2004), McCready and Ogata (2007),
Parikh (2001).
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3.2. Quality
Grice’s (1975) original notion of quality is demanding in terms of its call for knowl-
edge and evidence:
(13) Gricean quality “Contribute only what you know to be true. Do not say
false things. Do not say things for which you lack evidence.”
(Grice 1975)
Lewis (1976) suggests a less stringent pressure of roughly the same kind:
(14) Lewisian quality “The truthful speaker wants not to assert falsehoods,
wherefore he is willing to assert only what he takes to be very probably
true. He deems it permissible to assert that A only if P(A) is sufficiently
close to 1, where P is the probability function that represents his system of
degrees of belief at the time. Assertability goes by subjective probability.”
(Lewis 1976:133)
We work exclusively with this Lewisian version of quality. Moving to the Gricean
view would likely require a more complex metalogical interpretation of subjective
probability distributions. This might be correct, but the belief-based Lewisian view
seems better suited to our current application.
Both speakers and hearers feel the pressures of quality. For the speaker,
it is a cap on what he can felicitously say, no matter how great the pressures of
informativitymay be. For the hearer, it is a sort of guarantee that the speaker intends
to be trustworthy. Pragmatic enrichment based on quality is pervasive. For instance,
if you ask me where Sam is and I reply, “I saw him in the library earlier”, I don’t
completely answer your question. If you know me to be forthcoming, you will
balance quality against the other pressures to determine that I am not sure where
Sam is at present. After all, I provided less information than you asked for, so it
must be quality that prevents me from venturing a complete answer. If freed from
the constraints of quality, I might simply guess for the sake of providing a complete
answer, and communication would rapidly break down. Quality is arguably the
most fundamental of the pragmatic pressures.
Lewis’s (14) is essentially a formal view of the quality pressure. For our
analysis, we require just one additional concept: quality thresholds (Potts 2006), as
defined in (15).
(15) Every context c has a quality threshold cτ ∈ [0,1].
And now we come to our formalization of Lewisian quality:2
(16) An agent A can felicitously assert p in context c only ifCA,c(p)! cτ .
2This is a slight departure from the formulation in Potts (2006), in which ! is >. The earlier
formulationmilitates against thresholds of 1, whereas we think it is better to assume that this extreme
case cannot arise due to general facts about our epistemic limitations, rather than as a result of the
pragmatic theory.
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This corresponds roughly to the first clause of Grice’s quality (“Contribute only
what you know to be true.”), and it seems a straightforward interpretation of Lewis’s
general statement about assertability (14).
Quality thresholds tend to be above .98 absent other indicators of their po-
sition. It is often assumed that the threshold is always 1, i.e., that complete belief is
required for felicitous assertion (Büring 1998, de Jager and van Rooij 2007). Potts
(2006) presents evidence that this is too stringent, and the data and observations in
Taranto (2003) and Barker (2007) seem to support that view as well. In general, if
we are honest with ourselves, we nearly always fall short of 100% certainty. This
doesn’t keep us silent, though. The flexible view of quality in (16) makes sense of
this by allowing room for doubt.
4. The Evidential Strategy
We turn now to our theory of the pragmatics of evidential sentences. The theory is
based in the view that an evidential sentence actively changes the context of utter-
ance. In this sense, the theory defines evidentials as illocutionary force operators
(Faller 2002a). (We think it also makes good on the intuition that evidentials are
related to modals, but we defer that discussion to Section 5). At the heart of our
proposal is the idea that evidentials mark a particular sort of speaker strategy: in
using an evidential, the speaker triggers a context comparison of a particular sort.
In this section, we first link evidential morphemes to a particular kind of
subjective probability (Section 4.1), and then we use those values to articulate the
evidential strategy (Section 4.2).
4.1. Probabilities and Evidential Morphemes
We noted above that evidential sentences carry a speaker commitment to the exis-
tence of a situation of a certain type, as in (4), repeated here:
(17) Uttering S[ev] commits the speaker to the existence of a situation in which
he receives ev-type evidence for [[S]].
The nature of these situations is vital to understanding the pragmatic strength of
evidential sentences. Consider a situation s in which someone receives hearsay ev-
idence for a proposition p. The conditional probability, given the common ground,
that s is a situation in which p is true might be very low. After all, people report all
kinds of crazy things, and woe to the trusting individual who believes all of them.
In contrast, a situation in which someone receives direct (e.g., visual) evidence for
p is almost always a situation in which p is true. The probability tends to be much
higher. It is higher still for the personal experience (ego) situations that are involved
in evidential sentences like the Eastern Pomo example (3a).
The above characterizations are inherently probabilistic. They ask, What is
the probability, given some assumptions, that this situation entails some particular
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piece of content? To model this, we proceed much as we did in Section 3.1 above.
We first define a class of contextually-conditioned probability distributions:
(18) The subjective probability distribution for context c:
Pc
def
= P(−|cCG)
where P is a uniform distribution over W and cCG ⊆ W is the common
ground for the discourse participants of c.
We believe that functions like Pc have a general role to play in pragmatic theory, but
we have just one application in mind: we aim to capture the above intuitions about
the contextually-determined strength of evidence sources. For this, we define, in
(19), a function that associates evidential morphemes with probabilities.
(19) Let ϕev be the proposition that a situation in which an agent obtains ev-type
evidence for p is also a situation in which p is true.
µ maps context–morpheme pairs to probabilities:
µc(ev)
def
= Pc(ϕev)
In most realistic contexts c, direct evidence is stronger than hearsay evidence, so
we might have µc(direct) = .98 and µc(hearsay) = .75. However, in (perhaps far-
fetched) contexts c in which direct perception is unreliable but speakers are scrupu-
lous about passing on information only after it has been verified up to epistemic
limits, µc(hearsay) might be higher than µc(direct).
The contextual dependency of this function is an important factor. If the
speaker is known to hallucinate, then his direct perception evidentials might not
carry much weight. Conversely, if the hearsay report is known to be from a reliable
source, then it might be perceived as highly trustworthy, perhaps even trumping di-
rect perception. Thus, it is important that we conditionalize the general distribution
for each context, so that common-ground entailments are taken into account.
We are still dealing with subjective probabilities, rather than chance or fre-
quency (Lewis 1980). Imagine some small children who trust reports from their
parents more than their own eyes, so that “Mom says . . . !” can signal the highest
form of evidence possible for them (Tom Roeper, p.c.). These children are mis-
taken about the veracity of their parents’ claims, but this objective fact is not what
determines relative evidential strength. Rather, their common ground is the primary
factor in determining µc and, in turn, the contextual hierarchy. The values obtained
by µc are objective only insofar as they reflect a general understanding of the dis-
course participants in c. They might, though, be very different from actual chances
or frequencies.
This approach provides a ready explanation for the fact that evidential hier-
archies are hard to pin down (Section 2.2). Though direct evidence might be reliably
better than hearsay evidence, this is not a lexical fact per se, but rather a fact that
we derive from general regularities in the world and the context of utterance, and
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thus it is conceivable that things could be reversed in some situations. It is also
easy to see why conjectural and hearsay evidentials might be impossible to order
absolutely — these two kinds of evidence can be reliable or unreliable, depend-
ing on the circumstances. But we do furnish a (context-dependent) partial ordering,
and thus standard scalar reasoning (of a particularized sort) is generally possible for
sentences involving these morphemes. In our view, the ordering based on µ makes
good on Faller’s (2002b) insight that evidential hierarchies are best given in terms
of evidence types rather than morphemes. We order morphemes, but we do it in a
way that is keyed directly into evidence types (in context).
4.2. The Strategy
The theory itself is easy to state. Recall from Section 3.2 that every context c has an
associated quality threshold cτ . These thresholds are numbers in the unit interval,
and an agent A can felicitously assert p only if CA,c(p) ! cτ , as in (16). So the
threshold is a lower-bound on felicitous assertion.
Sincerely uttering a declarative evidential sentence of the form S[ev] is an
assertion of [[S]], and thus the threshold is in force even for these sentences; the
felicity of such an utterance by agent A is determined in part by CA,c([[S]]). This
would seem to be a problem, since ev might be a very weak evidential — say,
conjectural — and thus it might actually indicate that the speaker is well below the
threshold for [[S]]. This is where we make our substantive theoretical move: we
argue that the function of the evidential is to (potentially) change the contextual
threshold, from whatever it was to the value given by µc(ev). The old threshold is
replaced with a (potentially) new one derived from the common ground and geared
towards furnishing a reliability indicator. This theory is summarized in (20).
(20) If S[ev] is uttered by agent A in context c, then
i. A assumes a commitment to having ev-type evidence for [[S]].
ii. cτ becomes µc(ev), and then
iii. A performs a speech-act with [[S]] (probably an assertion if S is a declar-
ative, probably a question if S is interrogative, etc.).
It is crucial that the threshold changes before the speech act of (20iii). In regular
declarative sentences, the speaker’s pragmatic strategy with the evidential is to shift
the threshold to a point at which the assertion respects quality, (16). And we capture
this: A’s assertion of [[S]] is judged pragmatically in this new context (i.e., relative
to the new cτ ).
Our focus is the interaction between (20ii) and (20iii), but the speaker com-
mitment (20i) is the primary lexical contribution, so we cannot simply ignore it. We
therefore offer a few brief remarks.
First, it seems important that (20i) comes before the change to the threshold.
The content might best be thought of as a (very easily accommodated) presupposi-
tion, or we could venture a more clearly multidimensional analysis. Unfortunately,
we don’t have the space to explore this issue here.
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Second, more work needs to be done in exploring the influence of syntactic
position on (20i). Here, the interrogative data of Section 2.3 should play a ma-
jor role. Embedded contexts are also challenging. Such readings are a focus of
Sauerland and Schenner (2007), who look primarily at Bulgarian evidentials. (For
additional discussion of both issues, see Garrett 2001:§5,6.) Again, we cannot ex-
plore this issue here, so we must simply emphasize that the nature of this contri-
bution is relatively independent, as far as we can see, from our proposal, which
mainly concerns the interplay between the change to the threshold, (20ii), and the
utterances that follow it. (For declaratives, the next content evaluated is the main
descriptive content, as in (20iii).)
The shift to the threshold (20ii) has a hallmark of presuppositionality, since
it happens before the assertion. But we prefer not to think of this step as impos-
ing definedness conditions — though, of course, its action can lead to pragmatic
anomaly for the content to come. That is, it is possible for an assertion to be infelic-
itous before the evidential does its work but felicitous after. This will be the norm
for evidentials whose µ-values are low. And the threshold shift can, if it raises the
previous value, make an utterance that would have been felicitous before the shift
into one that is infelicitous.
4.3. Summary of Results
The context-shifting specified in (20) might seem unusual, but it derives the full
range of pragmatic phenomena discussed in Section 2.
Evidential Hierarchies (Section 2.2) Their variability follows from the fact that
evidential morphemes are ordered by the values of µ, which can vary from context
to context.
Readings in Interrogatives (Section 2.3) The initial puzzle is that evidentials can
appear in interrogatives at all, despite their orientation towards speaker evidence.
But their contributions in such environments turn out to be revealing. The evidential
is wide-ranging, in a sense. It seems not to be exclusively about the content of the
question and its preconditions, nor is it clearly about the replies. Both aspects of
the utterance seem to be targeted, as we see in (7) and (8). On our account, this
diffusion is entirely expected. The pragmatic function of the evidential is to shift
the context before the primary speech-act itself takes place. And we assume that
the threshold remains in its new position until new evidential morphology (or some
other pressure) changes it again. Thus, both the interrogative and any utterances
that follow feel the effects of the change described in (20ii).
Could more narrowly semantic accounts, say, those based on notions of
presupposition and modality, capture this indirect and long-distance effect on the
meanings and, in turn, on the discourse structure? We think they could. They
could do this by appeal to the pragmatic expectations generated indirectly by the
meanings involved. We wish to emphasize that this is precisely what we are up to.
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We have simply been very precise about how speaker expectations can work in this
way to shape a discourse.
Mixed Judgments about Assertion (Section 2.4) On our analysis, evidential-marked
declaratives are asserted, as is evident from (20iii). However, this assertion might
well be happening in a context in which the contextual threshold has been lowered
considerably. This is almost guaranteed to lead the hearer to perform comparative
inferences of the following form: the assertion was not made in a stricter context,
or a more normal one, and, as a result, its overall contribution is greatly weakened
as well. We depict this reasoning informally in (21).
(21) The speaker did this, not this.
1
hearsay(cτ)
⇓ [[Sam is a werewolf ]]
c′τ


1
[[Sam is a werewolf ]]
cτ


Evidential sentences present a second challenge for determining whether the
declaratives containing them are asserted. Their pragmatic values are very tightly
connected to their form, so much so that these values might count as intrusive
(Levinson 2000, Chierchia 2004). If we are right about the role of probabilities,
then speakers might therefore have a difficult time with the truth-value judgments
that go along with gauging assertions. Probabilities do not naturally support this
sort of boolean reasoning (Kamp and Partee 1995). As theorists, we can appeal
to the semantics for such relations, but speakers’ intuitions probably don’t reliably
tease this information apart from lexically-encoded probabilistic pragmatics.
Strengthening (Section 2.5) Moving the threshold up is as easy as moving it down.
We therefore expect this symmetry in evidential types. The real factor here is the
range of evidence that the morphological system allows speakers to connect with.
Descriptive Ineffability (Section 2.6) These difficulties of translation make sense
on our account. For us, evidentials do not denote propositions, nor do they directly
quantify over sets of propositions. They change the context in a highly context-
dependent way. If a language L lacks evidentials, then epistemic modals or par-
entheticals might provide the best rough-and-ready translation in L for evidential
morphemes, but these translations might fall short when it comes to reproducing
the effects of (20).
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5. Modality and Evidentiality
There is not space for detailed argumentation here, but it is worth briefly describing
how our account of evidentials might reveal both how they are related to epistemic
modals and also how the two can differ.
On the account summarized in (20), the quality threshold is actively changed
by the morphology. We suggest a more conservative characterization of the modal
strategy: here, the threshold remains fixed, but the addressee is implicitly invited
to compare two utterances: the modalized statement he heard and the unmodalized
statement that the speaker chose not to use. This utterance choice will likely convey
that the speaker is in the situation depicted in (22), in which S is off-limits, by
quality, but the modalized versions are pragmatically accessible.
(22)
1
[[might(S)]]
[[must(S)]]
cτ
[[S]]
It is nearly always the case that might(S) is perceived as weaker than S. This is
also a strong tendency for necessity modals, but it is not exceptionless for them.
Building on insights of Karttunen (1972), von Fintel and Gillies (2007), present
convincing evidence that some uses of epistemic must are not weaker than their
unmodalized counterparts. They argue that the modal signals a conclusion based
on inference or deduction. In formal proofs, such inferences can be as solid as
direct evidence, but they are perceived as weaker than direct evidence in normal
conversational circumstances, where we recognize that the entailments of the con-
text might not be valid in reality. What’s more, Birner et al. (2007) observe that
certain epistemic uses of would (as in That would be Chris, upon hearing a knock
at the door at his expected arrival time) mark “the speaker’s high level of confi-
dence in the truth of the proposition” (p. 320) and are, in fact, reliably perceived
as stronger than regular assertions (p. 320, footnote 2). Thus, in general, we might
allow that an epistemic modal can indicate something like the following: even if the
threshold were raised, the content would still be accessible, which conversationally
implicates increased speaker commitment.
So the central difference, we propose, is that the modal can’t change the
threshold, whereas the evidential can. We should take care not to let this over-
shadow an important connection between the two expression types that traces to
the role of subjective probabilities. On our account, both the evidential and modal
strategies are likely to be fueled by the same fact about the epistemic state of the
speaker: if p is the propositional content of the utterance, then CA,c(p) < cτ . In a
language with epistemic modals and evidentials, a speaker can say something about
p despite CA,c(p) either by qualifying it with a modal or by using an evidential to
change the current standard for assertability cτ . (Her choice is likely to be governed
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by the question of whether the evidence source is relevant at that point in the dis-
course and, presumably, whether any epistemic modals encode such information.)
This is an abstract connection, and that is arguably a virtue. After all, there
is little evidence that epistemic modals are related historically to modals (they de-
rive more commonly from aspectual markers and attitude predicates), and there
is no general consensus on the question of how deeply the relationship between
these two classes runs. For a range of opinions, see Matthewson et al. (2007),
Donabédian (2001), Faller (2002a,b), von Fintel and Gillies (2007), Garrett (2001),
Plungian (2001).3
6. Summing up and Looking Ahead
Building on the probabilistic foundation laid by Lewis (1986a:§5), we character-
ized the pragmatic strategy that evidentials embody. The characterization involves
a particular kind of context shifting (one that resembles that employed for expres-
sives in Potts (2007). As discussed in Section 4.3, it provides an immediate account
of a range of pragmatic features of evidential sentences (Section 2). It seems to set
up a fruitful connection with epistemic modality (Section 5), and its dependence on
context-shifting arguably does justice to the intuition that evidentials are illocution-
ary force operators.
We close this paper by suggesting that the account might be applicable to
utterance modifying adverbs and parentheticals — that it might, in particular, yield
insights into the hierarchy in (23), in which the degree to which it is asserted that
Ed is a werewolf seems to drop as we move from top to bottom.
(23) Seriously, Ed is a werewolf
Ed is a werewolf. Ed, as I heard, is a werewolf.
Ed, I heard, is a werewolf.
I heard that Ed is a werewolf.
Ross’s (1973) slifting construction (Ed, I heard, . . . ) is of particular interest. Like
evidentials, slifts yield mixed judgments about whether the content is asserted or
not. And, like evidentials, they encode something about the speaker’s source of
evidence for that main-clause content, though with much greater syntactic and se-
mantic freedom than is found with evidential morphemes.
In our terms, slifts lower the threshold. Many utterance modifying adverbs
raise the quality threshold. This seems to be the primary contribution of honestly
3We leave open the question of whether an epistemic modal might acquire an evidence-type
commitment and a context-shifting interpretation, thereby becoming semantically and pragmatically
just like an evidential.
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and seriously when set off intonationally as in (24) (Bach and Harnish 1979).
(24) a. Honestly, Ed is a werewolf.
b. Seriously, we need to get to work on the paper.
These do not have accurate paraphrases with verb-phrase adverbs or adjectives, nor
do they embed easily (if at all; Bach 1999). Rather, they seem to function solely to
strengthen speaker commitments. Strikingly, utterance modifiers can appear with
a wide range of complements (Seriously, go home; Honestly, is Ed a werewolf?),
a further parallel with evidentials (see Section 2.3). Faller (2002a:237–238) makes
the connection explicit, noting that both evidentials and utterance modifiers “are an-
chored to the hearer in content questions”. Thus, though grammaticized evidentials
might form their own linguistic class to the exclusion of parentheticals and adver-
bials, paying serious attention to (probabilistic) pragmatic values might furnish the
right level of abstraction for capturing the commonalities among them.
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